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Abstract 
I conduct an on-line experiment to decompose giving in a dictator game into amounts 
motivated by pure altruism and amounts motivated by the warm glow of giving as defined in 
Andreoni (1989).  By manipulating the price of benefit to the recipient while holding the price of 
the act of giving constant, I estimate separate values for giving motivated by warm glow and 
giving motivated by pure altruism,.  I find significant evidence of both pure altruism and warm 
glow as motivations for the amounts sent to an anonymous recipient.  However, I also find a 
large gender difference in the motivation for giving.  Females are significantly less sensitive to 
the price of benefit to the recipient than are males, suggesting females are motivated relatively 
more by warm glow and relatively less by pure altruism, while men display the opposite 
behavior. 
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“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness necessary to him 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it”  
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I use experimental data from a dictator game conducted over the internet to 
decompose giving into its altruistic and egoistic components in a within subject design, thus 
allowing a measurement of the warm glow effect (Andreoni 1989).  I find giving motivated by 
warm glow and giving motivated by pure altruism across demographic groups based on self-
reported responses to an exit survey, which allows a comparison of motivations in giving based 
on age, gender, and income.  
In economic experiments, subjects routinely choose not to maximize their payoffs.  In 
prisoners’ dilemmas, subjects frequently cooperate (Doebeli and Hauert 2005).  In public goods 
games, subjects often contribute (Zelmer 2003).  The simplest example of this behavior is seen in 
the dictator game.  In the dictator game, one subject is given an amount of money and then 
allowed to send any portion of that amount to another subject.  The Nash equilibrium is to send 
nothing.  While it is true that many subjects do keep all the money, many do not.  A significant 
fraction of subjects sends positive amounts (Engel 2011).  Traditional, neo-classical economic 
theory presents man as a rational, maximizing agent, motivated solely by material rewards to 
self.  This interpretation of human action does model economic behavior well in many 
circumstances.  However, in addition to failing to account for a wide variety of results in 
economic experiments, it does not explain large portions of economic activity seen in the real 
world.  
Addressing this gap in our understanding, Andreoni (1989) developed an impure altruism 
model of giving that included two distinct patterns of other-regarding behavior.  The paper 
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proposed that giving could be motivated by pure altruism where the giver derives utility from the 
benefit the gift provides to the recipient, and by pure egoism where the giver derives utility from 
the act of giving itself independent of its impact on the recipient; calling this latter effect warm 
glow.  A mixture of warm glow and pure altruism as motivation is characterized as impure 
altruism.  That paper also proposed an index of pure altruism 𝛼𝑖 such that: 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎 + 𝑓𝑖𝑒                                                                           (1) 
Where 𝑓𝑖𝑎 is the amount given by person i that is motivated by pure altruism and 𝑓𝑖𝑒 is 
the amount given by person i that is motivated by warm glow (Ibid., p.1452). 
Several prior studies have tested for the existence of warm glow and pure altruism as 
motivations for giving (Ribar and Wilhelm 2002), (Gangadharan, Grossman, and Jones 2014), 
but few have attempted to quantify the effect and to the author’s knowledge none have done so 
by demographic group.  Research addressing warm glow frequently takes the perspective of 
giving in a public goods context.  An example of this is Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) which uses a 
public goods game with variable private values.  They find evidence of a small warm glow 
effect, but no significant evidence of pure altruism.  By contrast and also in the context of a 
public goods game, Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) find statistically significant evidence of 
altruism but reject warm glow as a causal factor in subject behavior.  Crumpler and Grossman 
(2008) use a simple and innovative design, also used in (Luccasen and Grossman 2017), where 
subjects can give to a charity, but with a perfect crowding out effect.  Any amount given by the 
subject reduced by an equal amount a donation given to the charity by the experimenter.  
Knowing that their contributions would not alter the amount received by the charity, 57% of 
subjects still made a positive contribution.  Across all subjects, contributions averaged 20% of 
their endowments which is strong evidence of warm glow as a motivation.  Lilley and Slonim 
(2014) examined warm glow giving in a study of the volunteering puzzle, where people donate 
time to charities even when donating the wage equivalent sum of money is more efficient.  They 
find evidence of a mixture of pure altruism and warm glow as motivating factors in charitable 
contribution and estimate between 15.5% and 21% of amounts donated were motivated by warm 
glow.  In a study of choice between volunteering time or donating money, Brown, Meer, and 
Williams (2013) find that subjects prefer to donate time rather than money even when it is the 
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less efficient choice.  They argue that the cause is a preference for the warm glow of 
volunteering.  Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2014) decompose charitable giving by motivation and 
find significant evidence of both war glow and pure altruism.  Konow (2010) find that charitable 
giving cannot be explained by warm glow alone and is more consistent with subjects following 
context specific economic norms.  Karlan and List (2005) use a natural field experiment of 
charitable giving and find that providing matching funds increases amount donated, but higher 
match rates from $1:$1 to $3:$1 do not significantly increase donations further.  Eckel and 
Grossman (2003) find framing an additional amount as a match rather than as a mathematically 
equivalent rebate increases amounts given.  Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) find a demographic 
difference in giving motivation with warm glow being a significant factor for women but not for 
men, and for neither gender do they find evidence of pure altruism.  In this paper, I extend the 
literature by measuring differences in the relative influence of warm glow and pure altruism as 
motivations for giving across demographic groups of age, income, and gender. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the 
theoretical model of giving.  Section 3 describes the experimental design.  Section 4 reviews 
results.  Section 5 is discussion, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Model 
I differentiate between giving motivated by benefit to the recipient and giving motivated 
by benefit to the giver by varying their relative prices.  If I observe dictators sending the same 
amount of money regardless of how much I as experimenter multiply it, then I can conclude that 
they are motivated by the constant price of the act of giving and not by the varying price of 
benefit to the recipient. 
Assume a dictator 𝑖 has an endowment 𝑦𝑖 and utility function 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ [𝑋|0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖] is the portion of 𝑦𝑖 retained, 𝑧𝑖 ∈ [𝑍|𝑧𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖] is the amount sent to 
another subject 𝑗, and given multiplication factor μ,  𝑧𝑗 ∈ [𝑍|𝑧𝑗 = 𝜇𝑧𝑖] is the amount received by 
subject 𝑗.  Also assume  𝜇 = 1.  The choice of 𝑧𝑖 may be motivated by the welfare of the 
recipient entering directly into the utility function of the dictator 𝑧𝑖; utility from the act of giving 
unrelated to the welfare of the recipient 𝑧𝑗; or a mixture of the two motives, balanced against the 
amount retained 𝑥𝑖.  Now, assume that for an amount 𝑧𝑖 sent by the same dictator, an anonymous 
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recipient will receive 𝑧𝑗 = 𝜇𝑧𝑖 where 𝜇 > 1.  If the dictator is motivated by 𝑥𝑖and 𝑧𝑗, then the 
dictator will reallocate towards 𝑧𝑗 and away from 𝑥𝑖 compared to the prior case where 𝜇 = 1.  
However, if the dictator receives utility from 𝑧𝑖 but not from 𝑧𝑗 then no reallocation will occur.  
By observing the extent to which subjects vary 𝑧𝑖 as a function of μ , I can infer the relative 
contributions to utility from both 𝑧𝑖 and 𝑧𝑗 , and estimate values for Andreoni’s α which is the 
ratio of giving due to pure altruism to total giving.  
I implement this analysis by asking subjects how much of an initial endowment they 
would chose to send to an anonymous, passive counterpart given that the amount chosen will be 
multiplied by the experimentor.  Each subject is presented with a variety of values for the 
multiplier 𝜇 ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.  At μ = 0.2 the counterpart receives 20% of the 
amount sent, up to μ = 5.0 where the counterpart receives 500% of the amount sent, with one 
choice randomly selected for payment.  Using a continuous range from 0.2 to 5.0 was considered 
(List, Sadoff, and Wagner 2011), but was not chosen in order to reduce subjects computaional 
burdon. 
Given that the amounts subjects choose to send are censored from below by zero and 
from above by the $1 endowment, OLS estimates of the conditional mean would be biased 
(Rigobon and Stoker 2009).  To avoid this bias, I use quantile regression of the conditional 
median.  I chose this option because it is robust to censoring (Portnoy 2016) and non-parametric, 
thus avioding the both the sensitivity to heteroskedasticity found in Tobit estimation (Arabmazar 
and Schmidt 1982) and the necessesity of assumptions about the data generating process1. 
For each subject’s set of choices of amounts to send, I perform the regression shown in 
equation 2, where 𝑥𝑖 is the amount retained and μ is the value of the multiplier.  The initial 
endowment is $1.00, so 1 − 𝑥𝑖 is the amount sent by dictator i.  (1 − 𝑥𝑖) = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝜇 + 𝜖𝑖                                                           (2) 
The estimate of the amount sent that does not vary as a function of the multiplication 
factor is the constant ?̂?0.  This is the portion of 1 − 𝑥𝑖 that was motivated by factors unrelated to 
                                                 
1
 The appearance of a large cluster of zero values can be consistent with non-censored data if the data is 
generated by two processes; one determining whether the value will be zero or non-zero, and another process 
determining the value given that it is not zero.  For a further discussion, see Greene (2008) pp. 854-857. 
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the benefit of the recipient and so is the isolated influence of warm glow.  ?̂?1𝜇 is the estimate of 
the amount sent that was motivated by the variable benefit of the recipient, and therefore is the 
isolated influence of pure altruism. And so,  ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝜇 is the estimate of the total amount sent 
prompted by both motivations.  Substituting these values into equation 1 gives equation 3 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?1?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝜇                                                                         (3) 
This calculation raises two issues.  First, since subjects are presented with a range of 
values for μ, if they are motivated by pure altruism to any extent (i.e. ?̂?1 ≠ 0) then ?̂?𝑖 will not be 
constant across μ.  Therefore, to facilitate comparisons with other studies that may not include a 
multiplier, I base all estimates of α on a value of 𝜇 = 1  A second issue is how to code ?̂? when 
both ?̂?0 and ?̂?1 equal zero.  Since this is the case when a dictator always sends nothing regardless 
of value of μ, I define (?̂?0 = ?̂?1 = 0) ⇒ (?̂? = 0) on the basis that since nothing was given, pure 
altruism could not be a motivation for giving.  It should be noted that in the case where a subject 
always gives nothing, the absence of pure altruism does not imply the existence of warm glow. 
After decomposing dictator giving by motivation for each subject, I test two sets of 
hypotheses: 
First, I test whether warm glow and pure altruism exist.  Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Warm 
glow and pure altruism respectively are significant motivators for giving.  𝐻1a: 𝛽0 > 0, 𝐻0: 𝛽0 ≤ 0.  𝐻1b: 𝛽1 > 0, 𝐻0: 𝛽1 ≤ 0. 
Second, I test whether warm glow and pure altruism vary by demographic group.  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Giving motivated by warm glow and pure altruism respectively vary by 
gender. 𝐻2𝑎: 𝛽0|𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ≠ 𝛽0|𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝐻0: 𝛽0|𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 𝛽0|𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒.  𝐻2b: 𝛽1|𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ≠ 𝛽1|𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝐻0: 𝛽1|𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 = 𝛽1|𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒.  
Hypotheses 3a and 3b: Giving motivated by warm glow and pure altruism respectively 
vary by age.  
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𝐻3a: 𝛽0|𝑎𝑔𝑒 ≠ 𝛽0, 𝐻0: 𝛽0|𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0. 𝐻3b: 𝛽1|𝑎𝑔𝑒 ≠ 𝛽1, 𝐻0: 𝛽1|𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽1. 
Hypothesis 4a and 4b: Giving motivated by warm glow and pure altruism respectively 
vary by income.  𝐻4𝑎: 𝛽0|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ≠ 𝛽0, 𝐻0: 𝛽0|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽0. 𝐻4𝑏: 𝛽1|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ≠ 𝛽1, 𝐻0: 𝛽1|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽1. 
3. Experiment Design 
3.1. Treatments 
The experiment is structured as a dictator game with a variable multiplication factor 
which increases or decreases the amount received by a randomly paired passive counterpart for a 
given amount sent.  Dictators receive an initial endowment of $1.00 and are instructed that they 
may send any portion of the endowment to a randomly selected subject in another group.  They 
are then presented with a list of multiplication factors 𝜇 ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and are 
asked to choose the amount they would send for each value of μ.  They are told that after making 
their choices, one choice will be randomly selected to be exectuted.  Multiplication factors are 
presented on a single page, with the order randomly set as high to low or low to high. 
Instructions as seen by subjects are included in appendix A2. 
Prior to starting the experiment, prospective subjects are asked to answer this question: 
“You have a basket containing five apples. You eat one apple and sell two apples.  How many 
apples are now in your basket?”  This question serves to prevent automated scripts from 
entering the experiment, similar in function to CAPTCHA3 codes seen on websites where 
automated spam is a concern.  Subjects are not allowed to enter the experiment without entering 
the correct answer.  Next, subjects are shown instructions followed by a pair of questions to test 
understanding4.  After answering the understanding question, subjects are shown the correct 
answer with an explanation of why it is correct.  Unlike the automated script filter question, 
                                                 
2
 Appendices and supplemental materials are available at https://robertmayo.wordpress.com/research-2/ 
3
 Information and examples of the use of CAPTCHA systems is available at 
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html. 
4
 85% and 65% of subjects answered the respective understanding questions correctly prior to being shown 
the correct answers and explanations. 
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subjects are allowed to proceed to the main body of the experiment regardless of whether they 
answered the understanding question correctly or incorrectly.  After entering the amounts they 
would send to a randomly paired subject in a second group for each value of μ, subjects are 
presented with an exit questionnaire which collects basic demographic data.  They are also 
invited to add an unstructured message about any technical difficulty encountered in the 
experiment or anything else they wish to share.  They are then shown their payoff and the 
experiment concludes.  For reasons discussed in the next section, subjects in the recipient group 
are recruited in a separate asynchronous session. 
3.2. Infrastructure 
The design described in the previous section was conducted over the internet using two 
main technologies. 
3.2.1. oTree 
oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016) is a software platform that allows multi-
player decision experiments to be conducted over the internet.  oTree experiments are coded in 
Python and use the Django web framework.5  Experiment development is done locally then 
uploaded to a remote web server along with the oTree supporting files.  I used the commercial 
web hosting company Heroku6 for hosting services.  After server deployment, experiments are 
run through a web-based administrative interface.  Since the experiment runs on a remote web 
server, subjects can enter the experiment from any location.  Participation is not limited to any 
particular operating system or device form factor.  All that is required is a browser with internet 
access. 
Python, the language used to code oTree experiments, is a popular general purpose 
computer language which is well suited and commonly used for web development.  It has the 
added advantage of being user friendly and relatively easy to learn.  oTree uses Python on top of 
the Django web framework7.  However, Django is designed for professional level web 
development and requires a commensurate level of technical knowledge to navigate.  Also, 
                                                 
5
 Technical details of Django can be found at https://www.djangoproject.com/. 
6
 Technical details of Heroku can be found at https://www.heroku.com/. 
7
 A web framework is a collection of functions that automate common development tasks. 
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prospective users of oTree should be aware that as of this writing it is still under development 
and so should be considered a work in progress. 
3.2.2. Mechanical Turk 
Subject recruitment and payment was done through the Mechanical Turk micro-
employment website.  Mechanical Turk is an Amazon service which allows workers to perform 
small tasks for modest compensation.  In Mechanical Turk terminology, a task is a Human 
Intelligence Task or HIT.  Employers, called Requesters, register with the service and deposit 
funds to pay workers to perform HITs.  Typical HITs are very easy for a human to do but very 
difficult to automate, such as identifying objectionable content in user generated web posts or 
classifying photographs by subject.  Thus, the Mechanical Turk marketing phrase “Artificial, 
artificial intelligence”. 
The experiment is posted to Mechanical Turk as a HIT using IRB approved 
advertisement language.  Workers who wish to participate accept the HIT and are transferred to 
the experiment website.  After completing the experiment, subjects are returned to the 
Mechanical Turk website and are free to proceed to their next chosen HIT.  Since there is no face 
to face interaction between requester and worker, automated scripts deployed to accept HITs and 
input random responses to generate payments are a possibility.  It is for this reason that the script 
filtering question discussed in the previous section is a wise precaution.  It has the added 
advantage of screening out persons who enter random responses, essentially mashing the 
keyboard in an attempt to receive payment with minimum time and effort. 
Interaction between dictators and recipients are done asynchronously. All dictators make 
their choices of how much to send, then at a later time a second group of Mechanical Turk 
workers is recruited as passive recipients.  Participants in the dictator group are ineligible to 
participate in the recipient group.  Since the information flow is only from dictator to recipient, 
the small time delay this method imposes between money sent and money received should not 
bias dictator choices.  This method was chosen due to a peculiarity of Mechanical Turk.  After 
posting a HIT, workers will see and accept the HIT with a variable delay of between a few 
seconds and a few minutes, depending on the number of workers searching for HITs at the time.  
If after accepting the HIT workers were paired with another worker, then whichever worker was 
the first of the pair to arrive would be unable to proceed into the experiment until the next worker 
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accepted the HIT and completed the pair.  If the rate of arrival exceeds a few seconds, workers 
with higher levels of impatience may preferentially return the HIT or otherwise exit believing 
that the wait may be excessive or that the HIT is malfunctioning.  This could initiate a cascade of 
workers being unable to be paired in a reasonable amount of time causing the experiment to fail.  
Experiments have been run successfully on Mechanical Turk using real-time interaction between 
group members (Mayo, McCabe, and Kreuger 2016), but this issue must be taken into 
consideration in experiment design. 
3.3. Sample and randomization 
No personally identifying information is passed from worker to requester other than a 
unique Mechanical Turk worker identification number.  Amazon securely stores workers’ 
personal information including financial information required to process payments.  This 
simplifies experimenter record keeping and ensures subject privacy, but also raises the 
possibility of workers attempting to participate in the experiment repeatedly.  Through the oTree 
API, a worker qualification can be set.  This tells Mechanical Turk that the requester only wants 
the HIT to be accessible by workers who meet certain criteria.  The two criteria used in this 
experiment were that the worker must reside in the United States and not have previously 
participated in the experiment.  Amazon verifies workers’ country of residence by requiring 
payments to workers claiming United States residence be deposited electronically to a United 
States bank account.  The association between bank account and worker ID number also restricts 
the ability of one worker holding more than one Mechanical Turk worker account.  Amazon also 
uses proprietary methods of fraud control not publicly disclosed. 
Workers are not able to access any information about the content of the experiment prior 
to accepting the HIT assignment, other than IRB risk disclosure and a description of the HIT as 
an academic experiment in decision making.  Therefore there is little reason to suspect 
significant bias in results caused by self selection into the experiment.  The on-line environment 
does, however, raise methodological questions about the external validity of experiments 
conducted without substantial control of subjects’ environments (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 
2011).  In addition, stakes in on-line experiments using Mechanical Turk can be an order of 
magnitude lower than the same experiment would require if conducted in an in-person laboratory 
setting.  Amir, Rand, and Gal (2012) studied both of these issues by replicating a series of classic 
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economic experiments in an on-line environment and found no significant difference between the 
behavior of on-line and in-person subjects.  Fortuitously, the stakes studied in the on-line 
treatments were the same as used in this experiment, $1.00. 
Another issue of potential concern is the demographic composition of the subject pool 
and how it may differ from the demographics of subjects available for in-person experimentation 
in ways that might call into question the generalizability of results.  Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 
(2012) examined the demographics of Mechanical Turk workers who participated in experiments 
and found the distribution to be closer to that of the United States population than is found in 
subjects reported in a group of in-person studies published in major political science journals. 
4. Results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
The experiment was run over four consecutive weekdays.  146 Mechanical Turk workers 
accepted the HIT and 1128 completed the experiment giving a dropout rate of 23%.  This dropout 
rate is quite high when compared to the typical in-person laboratory experiment, but is actually 
good for on-line experiments.  Dropout rates of over 50% are not uncommon in on-line 
experiments (Dandurand, Shultz, and Onishi 2008).  This is understandable given the lack of 
social sanction for exiting an experiment prematurely by simply closing a browser window. 
The sample has a mean age of 34 and has reasonable gender balance at 59% male and 
41% female.  Mean income is $53,600 per year.  Summary statistics are shown in table 1.  Mean 
amounts sent by multiplier and demographic group are shown in table 3.  Age and income 
demographic groups are defined as above or below their mean values. 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Age 34.14 9.99 18.00 59.00 
Income (in thousands) $53.60 $45.96 $0.00 $250.00 
Female 0.41 
   N 112 
   
                                                 
8
 Although online experiments are typically less costly than laboratory experiments, sample size was 
nonetheless constrained by the research budget.  
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Table 2.  Pairwise demographic correlations. 
 Age Gender† Income 
Age 1.000   
Gender 0.2984 1.000  
Income 0.0823 -0.0101   1.000 
†Female = 1, Male = 0 
Table 3.  Mean amounts sent by multiplier and demographic group. 
  Multiplier μ  
Group N 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 2 3 4 5 
All 112 $0.24 $0.23 $0.25 $0.26 $0.31 $0.31 $0.31 $0.31 $0.32 
Male 66 $0.20 $0.20 $0.23 $0.25 $0.31 $0.32 $0.34 $0.34 $0.34 
Female 46 $0.28 $0.27 $0.29 $0.27 $0.33 $0.30 $0.28 $0.26 $0.29 
Age < 34 65 $0.20 $0.21 $0.25 $0.25 $0.30 $0.32 $0.31 $0.31 $0.33 
Age ≥ 34 47 $0.28 $0.26 $0.26 $0.28 $0.34 $0.31 $0.32 $0.30 $0.32 
Income < $53.6k 70 $0.21 $0.21 $0.24 $0.25 $0.31 $0.31 $0.31 $0.32 $0.33 
Income ≥ $53.6k 42 $0.28 $0.26 $0.28 $0.28 $0.33 $0.32 $0.32 $0.30 $0.32 
 
4.2. Motivation for giving 
Quantile regression of amounts sent on multiplication factor for each dictator in the full 
sample produced within subject estimates of the coefficient on the variable μ representing the 
effect of changing the price of benefit to the recipient in the dictator’s choice of amount to send, 
and a constant term representing the choice of amount to send that was not a non-constant 
function of the price.  These values estimate the amounts sent motivated by warm glow (constant 
term) and pure altruism (coefficient on μ).  A one-sample t-test showed the regression constant 
terms to be greater than zero, (Mean = 0.230, SE = 0.027, t(111) = 8.373, p = 0.000).  A second 
one-sample t-test showed the coefficients on μ to also be greater than zero, (Mean = 0.020, SE = 
0.007, t(111) = 2.764, p = 0.007).  Detailed test results are shown in appendix B.  Since both the 
coefficient on the multiplier and the constant terms are significantly greater than zero at the 0.01 
confidence level, the nulls of hypotheses 1a and 1b can be safely rejected.  This confirms the 
existence of both pure altruism and warm glow in the full sample.  The fraction of total giving 
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motivated by pure altruism (Andreoni’s α) in the full sample was slightly over one-third, (Mean 
= 0.379, SD = 0.730).  The distribution of α is shown in figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Kernel density plot of α  for full sample.  
Kernel is Gaussian, bandwidth = 0.2. 
 
 
 
 
4.3. Motivation by age 
Pearson’s r showed giving motivated by warm glow was slightly declining with the age 
of the dictator, but the effect was not statistically significant. (r = -0.0047, n = 112, p = 0.961).  
Similarly, giving motivated by pure altruism was slightly increasing with the age of the dictator 
and was also not statistically significant. (r = 0.0012, n = 112, p = 0.990).  Since age is not a 
significant predictor of either amounts sent due to warm glow or amounts sent due to pure 
altruism, the nulls of hypotheses 3a and 3b are not rejected.  A test of α also showed no 
significant correlation with age, (r = 0.001, n = 112, p = 0.995).  Warm glow, pure altruism, and 
α as functions of age are shown in figures 2, 3, and 4 respectively. 
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Figure 2.  
Warm glow as a function of age. 
 
 
Figure 3.  
Pure altruism as a function of age. 
 
 
Figure 4.  α as a function of age. 
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4.4. Motivation by income 
Pearson’s r showed a small positive correlation between warm glow and income that was 
not statistically significant, (r = 0.037, n = 112, p = 0.697).  Pure altruism was also positively 
correlated with income and not statistically significant, (r = 0.017, n = 112, p = 0.857).  Finally, 
α was slightly, but not significantly, increasing in income, (r = 0.034, n = 112, p = 0.719).  
Warm glow, pure altruism, and α as functions of income are shown in figures 5, 6, and 7. 
 
Figure 5.  
Warm glow as a function of income. 
 
 
Figure 6.  
Pure altruism as a function of income. 
 
 
Figure 7.  α as a function of income. 
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4.5. Motivation by gender 
Women in the sample sent more due to warm glow (mean = $0.27) than did men (mean 
= $0.20).  However, a two-sample t-test did not find this difference to be significant, (t = -1.280, 
n(male) = 66, n(female) = 46, p = 0.204).  By contrast, women sent essentially nothing due to 
pure altruism (mean = $0.001) compared to men (mean = $0.034).  This difference was 
statistically significant, (t = 2.332, n(male) = 66, n(female) = 46, p = 0.022).  α was higher for 
men (0.469) than for women (0.250), but this difference was of borderline significance, (t = 
1.613, n(male) = 66, n(female) = 46, p = 0.110).  Warm glow, pure altruism, and α by gender 
are shown in figures 8, 9, and 10.  Figure 11 shows the amounts sent as a function of the 
multiplier μ for men and for women. 
Figure 8. 
Warm glow by gender. 
 
Figure 9. 
Pure altruism by gender. 
 
Figure 10. α by gender. 
 
Figure 11. 
Amounts sent as a function of the multiplier μ for men and for women. 
17 
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
The results reported in the previous section confirm that both warm glow and pure 
altruism are motivating factors in subjects’ decisions to give to an an anonymous, paired subject.    
These results confirms the existence of both warm glow and pure altruism that has been found in 
several prior studies.  Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) found evidence of warm glow, but not of pure 
altruism as a motivation for giving in a public goods game.  By contrast, Goeree, Holt, and Laury 
(2002) found evidence of pure altruism, but not of warm glow as motivating factors in subjects’ 
behavior.  And Crumpler and Grossman (2008) found strong evidence of warm glow as a 
mativator, but did not test for the existence of pure altruism.  Beyond establishing the existence 
of both effects, by multiplying mean amounts sent by mean α for each gender, I find that warm 
glow is responsible for the majority of giving (61%) with pure altruism composing a minority 
share (39%).  This contradicts the findings of  Lilley and Slonim (2014) which quantified the 
relative influence of the two motivators and found that that larger share of giving was due to pure 
altruism (79%) with only 21% resulting from warm glow.  By contrast, Eckel and Grossman 
(1996) found that men were largely insensitive to changes in the price of punishment. 
Examining results by demographic group shows no significant relationship between 
motivation and either the age or income of the dictator.  Although, both giving due to pure 
altruism and warm glow were slightly increasing in income which is unsurprising since total 
giving also increased slightly with income.  Other than showing that both motivators exist, the 
major result is the difference in motivation by gender.  Although males and females were equally 
generous when the multiplier effect was absent (μ = 1.0) with males giving $0.31 and females 
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giving $0.33, their behavior diverged significantly at other multiplier levels.  At the lowest 
multiplier value where only 20% of the amount sent reached the recipient, females still gave 
$0.28, while males by contrast reduced their giving to $0.20.  At the highest multiplier value, 
where the recipient received 500% of the amount sent, females sent almost exactly the same 
amoun $0.29.  Males responded to the highest multiplier by increasing their amounts sent to 
$0.34.  This implies that females are motivated almost entirely by warm glow, while men are 
significantly motivated by both warm glow and pure altruism.  This gender difference is broadly 
consistent with the findings of Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) which found warm glow to be a 
significant factor for women but not for men, although for neither gender do they find evidence 
of pure altruism.  Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) also find that males are much more responsive 
to the price of benefit to the recipient, while females tend to send the same amount regardless of 
price.  By contrast,  
5.1. Alternative explanations and possible objections 
The decomposition of motives into warm glow and pure altruism depends on the 
assumption that warm glow giving is unrelated to the amount received by the passive subject.  It 
is possible that this is not true.  If, for example, a dictator derived utility from the amount 
received by the passive player but had no concern for the welfare of that player, then the dictator 
could be highly responsive to price and simultaneously motivated only by warm glow.  If so, 
then values generated by this model for giving motivated by warm glow would be a lower bound 
and values for α would be an upper bound.  Although this is possible, it would require a 
substantial revision of the impure altruism model that is beyond the scope of this paper.  It is also 
possible that a person giving a fixed percentage of their endowment regardless of the amount 
received by an anonymous counterpart may be motivated by concern for the recipient, but 
effecting that goal through a tithing rule, as was seen in Eckel and Grossman (2004). 
The major results in terms of demographic differences could be artifacts of some form of 
self selection by workers prior to accepting the HIT or afterwards within the 20% who began the 
study but did not complete it.  Selection prior to accepting the HIT is unlikely because the 
advertisement language was deliberatly vague about the nature of the experiment, but absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence so the possibility cannot be ruled out. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper reports the results of an on-line experiment designed to disaggregate giving in 
a dictator game into the portion motivated by pure altruism and the portion motivated by warm 
glow, as described in Andreoni (1989).  By manipulating the price of benefit to the recipient 
while holding the price of the act of giving constant, I am able to estimate values for a coefficient 
of altruism α (Ibid. p1452).  I find significant evidence of both pure altruism and warm glow as 
motivations for giving.  In addition, I repeat the statistical estimation on sub-sets of the sample 
based on demographic criteria as reported in an exit survey.  The fraction of amounts sent to an 
anonymous recipient that are motivated by warm glow is uncorrelated with the age of the 
dictator and is increasing in dictator’s income, but the relationship is not statistically significant.  
An analysis by gender shows that male subjects responded strongly to price suggesting they are 
mostly motivated by pure altruism, while female subjects were almost completely insensitive to 
price suggesting a large fraction of giving motivated by warm glow and little motivated by pure 
altruism. 
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Appendix A. Experiment Interface 
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Appendix B. Test Results Detail 
 
ttest warm_glow == 0 
 
One-sample t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
warm_g~w |     112    .2299667    .0274652    .2906639    .1755427    .2843908 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    mean = mean(warm_glow)                                        t =   8.3730 
Ho: mean = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      111 
 
    Ha: mean < 0                 Ha: mean != 0                 Ha: mean > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
. ttest pure_altruism == 0 
 
One-sample t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pure_a~m |     112    .0204058    .0073824    .0781276    .0057772    .0350345 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    mean = mean(pure_altruism)                                    t =   2.7641 
Ho: mean = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      111 
 
    Ha: mean < 0                 Ha: mean != 0                 Ha: mean > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9967         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0067          Pr(T > t) = 0.0033 
 
 
. summarize alpha 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |        112    .3790759    .7299327  -.2564103        2.5 
 
 
. pwcorr age warm_glow, sig star(.05) obs 
 
             |      age warm_g~w 
-------------+------------------ 
         age |   1.0000  
             | 
             |      112 
             | 
   warm_glow |  -0.0047   1.0000  
             |   0.9609 
             |      112      112 
 
 
. pwcorr age pure_altruism, sig star(.05) obs 
 
             |      age pure_a~m 
-------------+------------------ 
         age |   1.0000  
             | 
             |      112 
             | 
pure_altru~m |   0.0012   1.0000  
             |   0.9896 
             |      112      112 
 
 
. pwcorr age alpha, sig star(.05) obs 
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             |      age    alpha 
-------------+------------------ 
         age |   1.0000  
             | 
             |      112 
             | 
       alpha |   0.0006   1.0000  
             |   0.9946 
             |      112      112 
 
 
. pwcorr income warm_glow, sig star(.05) obs 
 
             |   income warm_g~w 
-------------+------------------ 
      income |   1.0000  
             | 
             |      112 
             | 
   warm_glow |   0.0372   1.0000  
             |   0.6970 
             |      112      112 
 
 
. pwcorr income pure_altruism, sig star(.05) obs 
 
             |   income pure_a~m 
-------------+------------------ 
      income |   1.0000  
             | 
             |      112 
             | 
pure_altru~m |   0.0173   1.0000  
             |   0.8565 
             |      112      112 
 
 
. pwcorr income alpha, sig star(.05) obs 
 
             |   income    alpha 
-------------+------------------ 
      income |   1.0000  
             | 
             |      112 
             | 
       alpha |   0.0344   1.0000  
             |   0.7185 
             |      112      112 
 
 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |      66    .2006072    .0353998    .2875897    .1299089    .2713056 
       1 |      46    .2720912    .0432014    .2930061    .1850791    .3591032 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     112    .2299667    .0274652    .2906639    .1755427    .2843908 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0714839    .0558526               -.1823532    .0393853 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.2799 
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  95.8126 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1018         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2037          Pr(T > t) = 0.8982 
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. ttest pure_altruism, by(female) unequal 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |      66    .0342527    .0098199     .079777    .0146411    .0538643 
       1 |      46    .0005386    .0106104    .0719631   -.0208318     .021909 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     112    .0204058    .0073824    .0781276    .0057772    .0350345 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .0337141    .0144572                .0050412     .062387 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.3320 
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  102.859 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9892         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0216          Pr(T > t) = 0.0108 
 
 
. ttest alpha, by(female) unequal 
 
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |      66    .4693329    .0934783    .7594212    .2826439    .6560219 
       1 |      46    .2495768     .099139    .6723935    .0499006     .449253 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     112    .3790759    .0689722    .7299327     .242403    .5157489 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .2197561    .1362598               -.0504586    .4899709 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.6128 
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  103.789 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9451         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1098          Pr(T > t) = 0.0549 
 
